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FEDERAL INCOME TAX AND DEALINGS
IN REAL ESTATE
DONALD MCDONALD* and JOHN W. FAWcETT, III*
A great many people have purchased real estate in the last few
profitable years and have approached counsel for tax advice in con-
nection with it. If counsel has been fortunate his clients have con-
sulted him before actually buying, but no matter how real estate is
acquired it is well to know the income tax consequences of (i) the
manner of holding it, and (2) its sale.
As used here, the term "real estate" includes both unimproved land
and any depreciable improvements on it. The manner of holding real
estate determines the tax treatment of the proceeds from its sale.
The Internal Revenue Code taxes "... gains, profits, and income
derived from ... sales or dealings in property, whether real or per-
sonal ... "I At the same time, it provides special treatment for gain or
loss on the "sales or exchanges of capital assets," whether held less or
more than six months.2 Capital losses are deductible only to offset
capital gains (and not over $1,ooo of other income in the case of
individuals),3 and may be carried over for five successive years.4 Net
capital gains on assets held over six months are subject to a fifty per-
cent deduction.5
The Code defines "capital assets" to include "... property held by
the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business) .... 6
Then it makes certain exclusions.
The application of the first two of these exclusions to transactions
in real estate has led to a great deal of litigation. Subsection (A) ex-
*Member of the Philadelphia Bar.
2Internal Revenue Code, § 22(a); cf. Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Semitanka,
255 U. S. 509 (1921).
2Code, §§ 117(b) , (c), (d) and (e).
3Code, § 117 (d).
4Code, § 117 (e).
5Code, § 117(b).
OCode, § 117 (a)(i).
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cludes from capital assets "stock in trade of the taxpayer or other
property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory
of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property
held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business."
7
Subsection (B) excludes from capital assets "property used in his
trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for
depreciation provided in section 23(1), or real property used in his
trade or business."
8
Capital gain treatment was originally conceived to avoid the un-
fairness of taxing in one year at progressive rates gains which have
accumulated unrealized over many years.9 To exclude "inventory,"
therefore, from the definition of capital assets is probably justified.
Normally, it turns over rapidly. Moreover, it would be impossible to
determine a holding period for each item of an ordinary inventory.
Ordinary rates were for ordinary business profits. Such profits probably
arise more from salesmanship or service than from any increase in the
value of the property.
In real estate dealings turnover is slower, and gain results more
from long-term value increase. The distinction is recognized, because
real estate cannot be inventoried in computing income.' 0 Also, a dealer
is allowed depreciation on houses held for sale. 11 Notwithstanding
these differences, the dealer pays an ordinary rate on his sales, be-
cause "capital assets" do not include "property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business."'12 This exclusion gives the investor who wants to dabble
in real estate his greatest tax trouble.
In 1942 Congress saw the hardship of paying tax at ordinary rates
on the gains from sales of land and depreciable property used in busi-
ness; 13 that is, the property covered in the "(B)" exclusion. Section
117 (j) provided relief.14 In effect it provides that net gains from the
sale or exchange of exclusion "(B)" assets held over six months, which
-Code, § 117(a)(1)(A).
'Code, § 117(a)(i)(B).
'Sen. Rep. No. 275, 67 th Cong. ist Sess., p. 12 (1921), 1939-1 Pt. 2 C. B. 181, 189;
H. Rep. No. 35 o , 6 7 th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 1o (1921), 1939-1 Pt. 2 C. B. 168, 176.
"Richards v. Corm'r, 81 F. (2d) 369 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936); Welch v. Corn'r, 59
F. (2d) io85 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932): 0. D. 848, 4 C. B. 47 (1921).
21I. T. 1342, 1922-1 C. B. 169.
'Code, § 117(a)(1)(A).
a-H. Rep. No. 2333, 7 7 th Cong. Ist Sess. (1942), 1942-2 C. B. 372, 415, 445; Sen.
Rep. No. 1631, 7 7 th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1942), 1942-2 C. B. 5o4, 545, 549.
14Revenue Act of 1942, § 151 (b).
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are not also excluded under "(A)", shall be considered as gains from
sales or exchange of capital assets held for more than six months. On
the other hand, if losses predominate, they are not considered as aris-
ing from capital assets and they are deductible in full.' 5
The Code thus sets up three important classifications into which
real estate may fall: (i) Capital asset; (2) real estate held primarily
for sale to customers, and (3) real estate held over six months and used
in a trade or business.
A net gain from sales of either capital asset or business real estate
is reduced fifty percent and subject to a maximum individual tax of
twenty-six percent.'6 The taxpayer who profits usually seeks this re-
sult. If the real estate was primarily for sale, the full gain is taxable.
Naturally, revenue agents seek this result.
A loss from the sale of capital assets does not reduce ordinary in-
come. The revenue agents prefer this position. The taxpayer who
loses usually insists that he always held the property primarily for sale
or used it in his business. Therefore, in two of the three categories,
"capital assets" or "for sale," whether there is gain or loss determines
the litigants' positions.
The best position for the taxpayer to establish is that the property
is used in his business but not primarily for sale. The gain, then, is
only half taxable and the loss fully deductible. Beyond that, the po-
sition the property owner prefers depends upon his expectation of
the trend of real estate values between the dates of purchase and sale.
If he is bullish, he should remain a passive investor; if he is bearish, he
should become a dealer.
These general principles are easy to state. The problem is to con-
trol the tax result, to predict the ultimate decision. There are a multi-
tude of factors. None controls. 17
The first factual question is whether the taxpayer is in a trade or
business where real estate is used or held for sale. This does not have
to be the real estate busiress. It is easy to enter a business in which
real estate is used. The rental of a single property is enough. When
the general counsel of Pittsburg Plate Glass moved to Pittsburg, he
rented his former residence in Kansas City. When he sold it, his loss
2Code, § 117(0)(2).
'Code, § 117(c).
1"Trapp v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 320 (W. D. Okla. 1948); Boomhower v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 997 (N. D. Iowa 1947); Guthrie v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 784
(W. D. Okla. 1947).
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was held fully deductible because he had been engaged in the rental
business.' 8 Conversely, the commissioner successfully contended that a
lawyer's gain on the sale of a 99-year leasehold was from the sale of
"property used in his trade or business."' 9 The leasehold covered a six-
story business building rented to several tenants. Even the rental of
part of an apartment building under construction is "business" within
the meaning of the statute.20
It is not even necessary that the taxpayer himself be active. The
business may be entirely conducted through agents. 21 For example,
three sisters inherited interests in eight New York buildings rented
for stores and apartments. Their agents handled all business dealings.
One sister contended her $i3o,ooo loss on the sale was a capital loss
and carried it over into the next tax year. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the carry-over, holding that
the sisters, though inactive, were using the real estate in a trade or
business. 2
2
Rental real estate usually has improvements. on the property. It
is difficult to use unimproved land in a trade or business. A mere
nominal rental will be disregarded.23 Although it has been contended
that any property held by a corporation was used in a trade or busi-
ness, 24 it is now clear that even a corporation may hold, but not
"use," property in its business.25 Once used in business, the property
need not be actively used in the year of sale.2 6 The mere purchase with
the intention of using the land in the business is sufficiexit, even if
the intended use may be impossible.27 But if the business use is pro-
28Leland v. Hazard, 7 T. C. 372 (1946), Acq. 1946-2 C. B. 3.
"Fackler v. Com'r, 133 F. (2d) 5o9 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943), affirming 45 B. T. A. 708
(1940-
M. A. Paul, 18 T. C. 6oi (No. 71) (1952), affirmed 2o5 F. (2d) 38 (C. A. 3d, 1953).
"Fackler v. Com'r, 133 F. (2d) 5o9 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943); John E. Good, 16 T. C.
906 (1951).
--Gilford v. Com'r, 2o1 F. (2d) 735 (C. A. 2d, 1953).
=Susan P. Emery, 17 T. C. 308 (1951); cf. Houston Deepwater Land Co. v.
Schofield, i o F. Supp. 394 (S. D. Tex. 1952).
2 Graves Brothers Co., 17 T. C. 1499, 1506 (1952); cf. Levin, "Capital Gain
and Loss Problems Pertaining to Real Estate" (1953) 26 Temple L. Q. 262.
2Graves Brothers Co., 17 T. C. 1499, 15o6 (1952); Dunlap v. Oldham Lumber
Co., 178 F. (2d) 781 (C. A. 5 th, ig5o); although the point is not mentioned, the de-
cision is inconsistent with its truth.
2Graves Brothers Co., 17 T. C. 1499 (1952); Carter Colgan Cigar Co., 9 T. C.
219 (1947).
2P. S. Edwards, 12 T. C. M. 1045, P-H Memo T. C. 53,307 (1953); Alamo
Broadcasting Co., 15 T. C. 534 (1950)-
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hibited at the time of purchase, a subsequent loss on sale will be only
a capital loss.
28
A change of real estate from one category to another, e.g., invest-
ment to business use or for sale can be effected. 29 If your client's unim-
proved real estate has fallen in value, he should try to put it to some
business use before selling, for example, farming, or a parking lot, or
storage space for a related business, or have a subdivision plan ap-
proved and hold it primarily for sale.
As the above cases indicate, the business taking real estate out of the
class of capital assets need not be an exclusive or even predominant
business.30 Because of the ease with which a taxpayer can find himself
in the rental business, it is probably safe to say that the only real
estate which is a capital asset is that which is unrented and held only
for investment.
More litigation arises over the issue of whether real estate ad-
mittedly used in a trade or business is held "primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."
Analytically, sections 117(a)(1)(A) and 117 (j)(1) of the Code es-
tablish the following requirements, all of which must be present to
put the gain, or loss, in the category of ordinary income:
i. The seller must be in a "trade or business."
2. He must hold the property involved "primarily for sale."
3. This "sale" must be "to customers."3'
4. This "sale," for which the property is held, must be "in the or-
dinary course" of that "trade or business."
The words "primarily for sale" also include for trade or exchange.32
The word "customers" has been held to include brokers, dealers or
speculators,33 even where the only sales are to such persons. The hold-
ing seems unwarrantedly contrary to the decisions involving securities.
A speculator in stocks and bonds is not a dealer, because stock brokers
are not "customers" of individuals selling securities through them.34
nMontell Davis, it T. C. 538 (1948).*
"Mauldin, 16 T. C. 698 (1951); affirmed 195 F. (2d) 714 (C. A. loth, 1952).
3'Friend v. Com'r, 198 F. (2d) 285 (C. A. loth, 1952); C. E. Mauldin, 16 T. C.
698 (1951), affirmed 195 F. (2d) 714 (C. A. loth, 1952).
ftAdded by Revenue Act of 1934, § 117(b).
"Jacob S. Gruver, i T. C. 1204 (1943), affirmed 142 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A. 4th,
1944).
"Jacob S. Gruver, i T. C. 1204 (1943), affirmed 142 F. (2d) 563 (C. C. A. 4th,
1944).
"Van Suetendael v. Com'r, 152 F. (2d) 654 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); Com'r v. Bur-
nett, 118 F. (2d) 659 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
19541
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.Most of the decisions have blended the findings to obscure the two-
fold required facts (i) the taxpayer must be in a "business" where
real estate is sold, and (2) the property sold must have been held pri-
marily for sale in the ordinary course of business.
"The business" in the ordinary course of which property is held
for sale need not be the real estate business as commonly understood. 35
However, if the client is in the real estate business, the burden of
proving that specific property or properties were not held primarily for
sale becomes much more difficult.36 Conversely, if he is not in the real
estate business, while the property may be primarily for sale to cus-
tomers, it is easier to prove that it is not so held.3 7 What leads to a
finding that the taxpayer is in the real estate business? The courts have
mentioned many facts. With the dual nature of the ultimate findings
in mind, I separate the factors into those primarily relevant to a
finding on the taxpayer's business and those primarily relevant to a
finding on the specific property.
Each fact alone only points toward the conclusion. Only the di-
rection each points is clear.
Fundamentally, a real estate dealer is an active merchant whose
stock in trade is a quantity of real properties and whose income is
based upon the difference between costs and sales prices; the investor
buys for long term increase in value or high current income from
the property itself, or both.
The frequency and continuity test often mentioned concerns
mainly the business of the taxpayer. Frequent sales or a large number
of sales in a tax year tend to indicate a "dealer." 38 Infrequent sales or
few sales in the period may mark an investor.39
Incidentally, it may be worth thinking about the unit in applying
the frequency test. Do you count acres? Or lots? Or agreements of
5Brown v. Com'r, 143 F. (2d) 468 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1944); subdivision to liquidate
inheritance from husband.
"'The deal was successful in Malouf v. Riddell, 52-1 U. S. T. C. § 9296, 72,460
1'-H Fed. 1952 (D. Calif., 1952); Charles S. Guggenheimer, 18 T. C. 81 (No. 1o)
(1952); Robert M. Hariss, 44 B. T. A. 999 (1941), affirmed 143 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A.
2d, 1944.)
3'Duniap v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F. (2d) 781 (C. A. 5 th, 1950); Thompson
Lumber Co., 43 B. T. A. 726 (1941).
"8Field v. Com'r, i8o F. (2d) 170 (C. A. 9th, 1956), affirmed 8 T. C. M. 170, 49,043
P-H Memo T. C. (1949); White v. Com'r, 172 F. (2d) 629 (C. A. 5th, 1949); Mc-
Fadden v. Com'r, 148 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1945); Brown v. Com'r, 143 F. (2d)
468 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1944); Ehrman v. Com'r, 10o F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944).
"Estate of W. D. Haden, 12 T. C. M. 825, 53,250 P-H Memo T. C. (1953); James
L. Vaughan, 7 T. C. M. 388, 48,076 P-H Memo T. C. (1948); 512 West 5 6th St. Corp.
v. Com'r, 151 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
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sale? There is judicial approval of counting only contracts of sale.4 0
Similarly, in applying the frcquency test, it must be put in the
proper perspective by using not the number but the percentage of the
holdings sold. Twenty lots sold in a block might be either the liquida-
tion of one-tenth of an investor's holdings or the turnover of two-thirds
of a dealer's stock-in-trade. Just as in the merchandising of personal
property, a high turnover in proportion to total holdings indicates
the dealer who buys to sell again. The investor is more likely to have
held most of his properties for a long time41 with a low percentage
turnover.
If an investor has held all his real estate through the upward swing
of the market, the concentration of sales on which he determines to
realize his gains before the break should not militate against him.
If a large number of properties have suddenly -been sold, inquiry
should be made whether any extraneous need for funds made the
sale necessary so as to lessen the effect of the frequency test.42
The continuity test is closely allied to the frequency test and looks
to the duration of the period in which sales have been frequent. If
the taxable sale was in 195o, how many sales were made in 1949? How
many in 1951?43 If there are many sales in many years, the taxpayer is
probably a dealer. Even if there are many sales, but they are all in one
year, he need not be a dealer. This is true if he can show that when he
was buying he was not selling, and when he was selling he was not
buying.4
4
Once the taxpayer has clearly entered the real estate business, the
fact that he made no sales for several years does not indicate that he
is no longer in business, particularly when those lean years are years
of general depression in real estate.45 But other evidence, such as other
full time employment, obviously isolated sales, one each year, at
salvage prices, 40 may lead a court to find that the "business" has been
abandoned.
Apart from the number of sales and the time during which they are
continuously made, incidental factors may be important. Some of these
10W. T. Thrift, Sr., 15 T. C. 366 (ig5o).
"Phipps v. Com'r, 54 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); cf. Palos Verdes Corp. v.
United States, 2o F. (2d) 256 (C. A. 9th, 1952).
'-See the futile use of this argument in Ehrman v. Com'r, 120 F. (2d) 6o7 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1941) and Richards v. Com'r, 81 F. (2d) 369 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
'3Ehrman v. Com'r, 120 F. (2d) 6o7 (C. C. A. 9th, x941).
"Austin v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 283 (S. D. Tex. 1953).
'3Walter G. Morley, 8 T. C. 9o4 (1947).
'0James L. Vaughan, 7 T. C. M. 288, 48,076 P-H Memo T. C. (1948).
1954]
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may unwittingly trip a taxpayer who considers the tax consequences of
his acts only after he has acted. Unless your client is satisfied to become
a real estate dealer with the probability that all his gains will be
ordinary income, he should avoid any written entries describing
his business as dealing in real estate. The most obvious of these is
the entry on schedule C of his tax return. The Government can offer
this in evidence as an admission.47 While the taxpayer can also use
such evidence, it loses force as a self-serving statement.48 Similarly,
the taxpayer should pause to consider the tax implications before
putting on his letterhead "real estate dealer," or "broker," or listing
himself as a "realtor" in the yellow pages of the telephone book. Even
his own books and records may embarrass him; for example, an entry
"costs of houses built for sale," when, in fact, he subsequently rented
them. Akin to these possibly damaging statements is the problem of
the broker's license usually required by state law.49 The taxpayer is
more likely to be held a dealer if he is so licensed than to be found an
investor if he is not. If the taxpayer is not licensed and all sales are
made through a broker, the fact should be emphasized in an argument,
but its weight is small because the principal may conduct a business
through an agent.50 Of course, if the client is well known in the city
as a real estate dealer, this will sway the court,51 and little can be done
by manipulating the minor indicia mentioned above.
Since the merchant generally has an established place of business,
the courts look to the maintenance of an office as implying that a real
estate dealer is involved.5 2 The implication is weak, however, since
many large investors maintain offices for the collection of income and
the management of income-producing property. One court has pointed
to a "rental office" as showing the lack of intention to sell.53
More important by far, and probably on a par with the frequency
and continuity tests, is the activity test. The courts give considerable
weight to sales activity both in discovering the taxpayer's business and
the purpose for which specific property has been held. Sales activity
4"Delsing v. Com'r, 186 F. (2d) 59 (C. A. 5 th, 1951) cert. den.; White v. Com'r, 172
F. (2d) 629 (C. A. 5th, 1949).
'8Henry H. Jackson, 303 P-H Memo T. C. (1942).
191n Pennsylvania the Act of May 25, 1945, P. L. 1023, 63 PS 431-481.
50White v. Com'r, 172 F. (2d) 629 (C. A. 5th, 1949); James L. C. McFadden,
2 T. C. 395 (1943), affirmed 148 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945).
"'Dobsoh et ux. v. United States, 53-1 U. S. T. C. § 9362 (W. D. Tenn. 1953).
r-E. D. Field, 8 T. C. M. 170 (1949); Snell v. Com'r, 97 F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A.
5th, 1938).
53Delsing v. United States, 186 F. (2d) 59 (C. A. 5th, ig5i) cert. den.
[Vol. XI
DEALINGS IN REAL ESTATE1954]
shows that the property was held primiarly for sale. No sales activity
means probably the property was primarily for business use or invest-
ment. Merely listing a property for sale is not considered sufficient
activity to make the seller a dealer.2 4 However, it seems that in at
least one Texas district court, little more is needed. In an opinion
favoring the collector, the judge stated:
"There was no advertising or listing, but it is rather difficult for
the court to conclude that Mr. Lobello was riding with a lady just for
fun when he passed by this tract"5-which she subsequently bought.
The most obvious form of sales activity is advertising, either generally
or of specific properties. The courts have even pointed to the placing
of signs on the property, a usual incident of any sale, as suggesting
that the property was held primarily for sale.
56
Also important is the amount of time spent in sales effort and ac-
tivity. Obviously, the man who spends full time attempting to sell his
and others' properties, alone or with the help of salesmen, is a real
estate dealer or broker.57
Basically, the decision turns on whether the seller is seeking buyers
or the buyers are seeking out the seller. An investor normally only ac-
cepts satisfactory unsolicited offers from purchasers.58 Once a prospec-
tive purchaser shows interest, the seller may safely negotiate actively. 59
What determines whether the property itself is held primarily for
sale to customers?
First, it should be carefully noted that the statute merely requires
that the property be held for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of the business, not that the taxable sale be made to a customer, or
even be made in the ordinary course of the business.60 This explains
why the courts do not give capital gain treatment solely because sales
are in liquidation. 61 The fact of liquidation is neutral. When other
"John Randolph Hopkins, 15 T. C. 16o (1950).
r-Lobello v. Dunlap, 53-1 U. S. T. C. § 9307 (N. D. Tex. 1953).
r"Dobson et ux. v. United States, 53-1 U. S. T. C. § 9362 (W. D. Tenn. 1953).
"Marsch v. Com'r, 11o F. (2d) 423 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1940).
r6Victory Housing No. 2 v. Com'r, 2o5 F. (2d) 371 (C. A. ioth, 1953), revising 18
T. C. 466 (1952); Dagmar Gruy, 8 T. C. M. 787, 49,217 P-H Memo T. C. (1949);
Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F. (2d) 315 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1947); Frieda Farley, 7 T. C. 198
(1946).
r"Austin v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 283 (S. D. Tex. 1953).
"OCode, §§ 117(a)(i)(A) and 117(j)(1).
"'Liquidation produced ordinary income in the following cases: Palos Verdes
Corp. v. United States, 2o F. (2d) 256 (C. A. 9th, 1952); Spanish Trail Land Co., 1o
T. C. 430 (1948); C. W. Oliver, 2 T. C. M. 78, 43,229 P-H Memo T. C. (1943);
Ehrman v. Com'r, 12o F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941); R. J. Richards, 3o B. T. A.
1131 (1934), affirmed 81 F. (2d) 369 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1936). Liquidation gain, passively
10 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
evidence shows that property was not held for sale in the ordinary
course of the business, only half the gain has been taxed.
62
While the original purpose for which the land has been acquired
is considered, it is not controlling.6 3 The regulations state that the
statute is concerned with the status of the property only "at the time
of sale." 64 Nevertheless, the courts persist in noting the manner and
purpose of acquiring the property; whether as an incident to another
business,6 5 by inheritance, 66 in satisfaction of a debt,67 as a sales pro-
motion scheme,68 because of expected improvement of adjacent prop-
erty,69 or to protect a mortgage investment.7 0
One class of cases in which there has been much recent litigation
arises from the sale of houses built for rental with priorities material
under Government restrictions on sale. Rental property is not usually
held for sale. The Government, contending for tax at ordinary rates,
has been more successful than the taxpayer.71 Those taxpayers who
have secured capital gain treatment have been able to show that the
houses were rented after restrictions were lifted, notwithstanding
the market favorable for sale, that the purchasers were unsolicited
and that the property was not advertised.
72
The Government's success shows there can be a conversion from
section 117(j) assets to ordinary assets. 3 Conversely, there can be a
accomplished, held capital in the following cases: D. T. Austin v. United States,
116 F. Supp. 283 (S. D. Tex. 1953); South Texas Properties Co., 16 T. C. ioo3
(1951).
"Martin Dressen, 17 T. C. 1443 (1952); Thomas E. Wood, 16 T. C. 213 ('951);
White v. Com'r, 172 F. (2d) 629 (C. A. 5 th, 1949).
3Maudlin v. Com'r, 195 F. (2d) 714 (C. A. ioth, 1952); Richards v. Com'r, 81
F. (2d) 369 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
"Regs. 111, § 29 117-1; cf. Maudine Neese, 12 T. C. M. 1o58, 53,309 P-H
Memo T. C. (953)-
'7Three States Lumber Co. v. Com'r, 158 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1946), land
sold after timber cut; Frieda Farley, 7 T. C. 198 (1946), for use in nursery.
1Fstate of W. D. Haden, 12 T. C. M. 825, 53,250 P-H Memo T. C. (1953);
Smith v. Gallagher, Col., 52-2 U. S. T. C. § 9482, 72,639 P-H Fed. 1952 (S. D. Ohio
1952); Kelm v. Chicago, St. P., M. SL 0. Ry. Co., 2o6 F. (2d) 831 (C. A. 8th, 1953);
Beck v. Com'r, 179 F. (2d) 688 (C. A. 7th, 195o).
O'Kanawha Valley Bank, 4 T. C. 252 (1944).
"Dunlap v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F. (2d) 781 (C. A. 5th, 1950).
OMetropolis Holding Corp., 1942 C. C. H. 7 85 iA, 42,542 P-H Memo T. C. (1942)
7°Steinegger v. Stuart, 52-1 U. S. T. C. § 9182 (D. Ariz. 1952).
'To September 30, 1953, for the government, ig Tax Court, 2 district court and
3 court of appeals' decisions: for the taxpayer 2 Tax Court, i district court and 2
court of appeals victories.
"Victory Housing No. 2 v. Com'r, 20o5 F. (2d) 371 (C. A. ioth, 1953); Delsing
v. United States, 186 F. (2d) 59 (C. A. 5 th, 1951).
Z'Rollingwood Corp. v. Com'r, 190 F. (2d) 263 (C. A. 9th, 1951); King v. Com'r,
189 F. (2d) 122 (C. A. 5 th, 1951) cert. den. 342 U. S. 829 (1951)-
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conversion from ordinary assets to section 1170) or to true capital
assets.7 4 Similarly, even a real estate dealer may hold some of his real
estate as a personal investment.7 5 In these cases it is essential to
maintain a clear factual separation or segregation of the properties.
To do so various steps are helpful, such as personal ownership of one
type and corporate ownership of other properties with separate
records for each class of property and, most important of all, no
on-again-off-again dealings with properties supposedly converted or
segregated.
In considering specific rental properties the duration of the lease
or leases is important. Month-to-month oral leases have been held to
indicate an intention to sell.7 6 The reasoning is that the property is
kept free of leases to which a purchaser would be subject.
The most critical and important factor applicable to the specific
property is whether the seller has subdivided it. Commonly, the num-
erous lots in a subdivision are held "primarily for sale to customers."
The factor has had great weight, even if the entire subdivision is sold
as a unit.7 7 The cases disregarding the factor are rare.78 In most cases,
where subdivided property had been found not primarily for sale, the
subdivision has been carried out by others.79
Improving the property by putting in streets and sewers and a
water supply also tends to show that the owner intends to hold for
sale. This does not always determine the case against the taxpayer,
however. In W. T. Thrift,8 0 the gain on a sale of 152 lots, a property
the taxpayer had subdivided and provided with streets, sewers and
water, was held only one half taxable. The court emphasized the
distinguishing fact as follows:
"The petitioner improved and developed the property...
solely for the purpose of facilitating the disposition of all or a
7 'Maudine Neese, 12 T. C. M. 1058, 53,309 P-H Memo T. C. (1953); James L.
Vaughan, 7 T. C. M. 288, 48,076 P-H Memo T. C. (1948).
7Valter R. Crabtree et al., 2o T. C.(No. 120) C. C. H. § 7616 (1953); Charles
S. Gqggenheimer, 18 T. C. 81 (No. io) (1952); Nelson A. Farry, 13 T. C. 8 (1949);
Elgin Building Corp., 8 T. C. M. 114, 49,015 P-H Memo T. C. (1949).
,ORubino v. Com'r, 186 F. (2d) 304 (C. A. 9th, i95i), cert. den.; Walter R. Crab-
tree et al., 2o T. C. (No. 120) C. C. H. § 7616 (1953).
•-Dobson et ux. v. United States, 53-1 U. S. T. C. § 9362 (V. D. Tenn. 1953);
C. Dorrance, 6 T. C. M. 675.
7P. S. Edwards, 12 T. C. M. 1045, 53,307 P-H Memo T. C. (1953); Collin v.
United States, 57 F. Supp. 217 (D. C. Ohio 1944).
'Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F. (2d) 315 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1947); Freida Farley, 7 T. C.
198 (1946).
8'15 T. C. 366 (195o), Acq. 1951-1 C. B. 3.
12 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
large part of the property to a specific and limited group of
builders with whom he had already reached an understand-
ing."
81
Faced with the multitude of factors, some of which suggest a dealer
and some an investor, what can the owner of real estate do? He may
own real estate he bought cheaply in the thirties which he now wants
to liquidate. It is manifestly inequitable if he has held it passively and
patiently all these years, to tax him at ordinary income rates on the
difference between its cost and its present fair market value.
If the land is unimproved, one suggestion would be to form a cor-
poration to deal in real estate, then sell the investment real estate to
it. The gain would then be taxed at capital gain rates. In making the
sale, however, short cuts which might bring section 112 (b)(5 ) of the
Code into the picture must be avoided. Also section 117 (o) bars this
solution if the property is depreciable. Then, capital gain tax rates are
available if the investment is sold as passively as possible, preferably
in a single sale. Or, it may be converted for a relatively long period
to the production of rental income and sold with capital gain bene-
fits.
Beyond the tax planning and income reporting stage, the tax-
payer may have to litigate. Recently, as in other issues where the Code
is general and a jury approaches the question with untutored com-
mon understanding, it may be wiser to pay tribute and sue for its re-
fund.
The continuity, frequency, activity, and subdivision tests must be
met in every case. Beyond that, as in any issue of fact, argument is
limited only by counsel's ingenuity. There will, of course, always be
some cases in which even the best counsel cannot make black into
white.
"115 T. C. g66, 371 (195 o ) [italics supplied].
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